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The underlying mechanisms of suggestibility consist both cognitive and social 
components. Generally speaking, age is associated with decreased suggestibility when 
the suggestibility is examined from the cognitive perspective. The dissertation 
examines how the acquisition of metacognitive ability (metamemory, narrative 
knowledge, source monitoring, and knowledge about knowledge) influences the extent 
of suggestibility from both cognitive and social perspectives. Preschool children’s 
suggestibility was measured with Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (VSSC) 
(Scullin & Ceci, 2001), which consists of two subscales, Yield focusing more on the 
cognitive aspect of suggestibility and Shift focusing more on the social aspect. Older 
children recalled more information, yielded to fewer misleading questions and shifted 
more answers upon repeated interview following negative feedback. In Study 1, both 
aspects of metamemory (declarative and procedural) were involved. Children who 
could better monitor their memory performance in the procedural metamemory task 
were less likely to yield to misleading questioning. In contrast, children with better 
declarative metamemory changed their answers more. Study 2 investigated the relation 
between preschoolers’ suggestibility and their knowledge about narrative context, 
which refers to children’s ability to appreciate the accuracy demand of the narrative 
context and take audience’s perspective into account. Children’s knowledge about 
narrative context appeared to be an independent predictor of the tendency to shift their 
answers in repeated interviews following negative feedback. The purpose of Study 3 
 was to examine the relation between source monitoring and suggestibility. On one 
hand, children who could better monitor sources of information were less likely to 
yield to misleading questioning. On the other hand, children with better source 
monitoring ability changed their answers more. Study 4 examined the relation between 
children’s knowledge about knowledge and suggestibility. An interview examining 
two types of knowledge about knowledge (temporary, situational judgement and trait, 
individual-dependent judgment) was specially designed for the study. There was no 
overall relation revealed but some individual items were associated with the extent of 
suggestibility. Taken together, the findings from the four experiments indicate the 
relation between metacognitive abilities and suggestibility in preschool children is 
complex. These studies extend our understanding of the individual factors associated 
with suggestibility, from both cognitive and social aspects. 
 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Shao, Yi was born on March 15, 1981 in Qingpu, a town in the suburb of 
Shanghai, China. She was the only child of her parents—her father, Shao, Xiaolong 
and her mother, Xu, Waneng. They received no formal education beyond primary 
school because of historical reason but placed a high value on education. They sent 
their only daughter off to Beijing, which is around 900 miles away, as a psychology 
major in Peking University in 1999. After half-a-year re-union while Yi worked as a 
primary school teacher, they sent her off again to explore further in psychology at 
Cornell University in 2004, on the other side of the world. Shao, Yi met Li, Yongchao 
in beautiful Ithaca, where they received marriage license in July 2007. Her daughter 
Winnie has witnessed the completion of the dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am grateful to Dr. Stephen Ceci, Qi Wang and Charles Brainerd, whose help, 
guidance, and inspiration made the study possible. I thank Diane Dang, Hallie Seegal, 
and Rebecca Sperling for their assistance. Special thanks go to children and their 
parents involved in the study from Ithaca Community Child Center , Immaculate 
Conception School, Ithaca Downtown Daycare Center and Coddington Road 
Community Center. This project is funded by College Grant of Human Ecology. 
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Biographical Sketch.......................................................................................................iii 
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................iv 
Table of Contents............................................................................................................v 
List of Tables. ...............................................................................................................vi 
Chapter 1 Introduction....................................................................................................1 
Chapter 2 Metamemory and Suggestibility: Full Picture May Only be Obtained by 
Full Examination............................................................................................................5 
Chapter 3 Growing Pains: Better Knowledge about Narrative Context, Higher 
Suggestibility................................................................................................................23 
Chapter 4 The Flip Side: Source Monitoring May Increase Suggestibility .................39 
Chapter 5 Knowledge about Knowledge and Suggestibility........................................56 
Chapter 6 General Discussion.......................................................................................72
 vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 Declarative metamemory interview questions............................................. 12 
Table 2.2 Correlations between VSSC, Age, and Metamemory.....................….……15 
Table 2.3 Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Suggestibility from Metamemory.. 
……………………………………………………………………...............…………17 
Table 3.1 Percentage of Accuracy for Components of Narrative Knowledge…...…...29 
Table 3.2 Correlations between Memory, Age, and Narrative Knowledge.………….32 
Table 3.3 Hierarchical Linear Regression Predicting Shift from Interval, Age, Yield 
and Narrative Knowledge.............................…………………………………………35 
Table 4.1 Correlations between Memory, Age, and  Source Monitoring.…………..45 
Table 4.2 Hierarchical Linear Regression Predicting Yield from Age, Free Recall and 
Source Monitoring.................................................................………………………...47 
Table 4.3 Hierarchical Linear Regression Predicting Shift from Age, Interval, Yield 
and Source Monitoring.........................................…………………………………….49 
Table 5.1 Knowledge about Knowledge Interview Questions and Percentage of 
Accuracy.......................................................................................................................63 
Table 5.2 Knowledge about Knowledge and Suggestibility ........................................66 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Since 1980s, influenced by the trend of adopting the presumption that all 
witnesses are competent to provide testimony (Federal Rule of Evidence 601), 
children increasingly began to serve as key witnesses in court (Haugaard, Reppucci, 
Laird, & Nauful, 1991). Meanwhile, there is a growing concern about children’s 
abilities to provide detailed and accurate reports of past events. It is well-established 
that younger children are more easily susceptible to false information provided by 
others than older children and adults (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1995). 
Recently, the focus of suggestibility study has moved beyond focusing on children of 
a certain age group to exploring the individual differences in suggestibility, which is 
of great legal implications. In the current studies, potential individual differences 
related to metacognition were examined. 
The past three decades have witnessed a growing interest in suggestibility 
research, beginning in the 1970s (e.g., Loftus, 1975; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; 
Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). Because of their legal implications, studies regarding the 
suggestibility of children have attracted a great deal of attention. In general, preschool-
aged children are more susceptible to misleading post-event suggestions than older 
children and adults (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993, 1995). However, 
within the same group, a great deal of variability in suggestibility is evident. 
Researchers have explored the individual characteristics that may account for 
variability within an age group. By far, the individual characteristics that have most 
often been identified are the cognitive factors of language abilityand creativity, and the 
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social factors of self-concept, maternal attachment, and the parent-child relationship 
(Bruck & Melnyk, 2004).  
In the current studies, I took a process prospective in examining suggestibility. In 
the process of incorporating information, individuals remember the specific 
event(event memory), know about their own memory (metamemory), know about 
other’s knowledge status (knowledge about knowledge), monitor information from 
different sources (source monitoring), know how to respond appropriately in an 
interview (knowledge about narrative context), and report information on demand 
(language). Except event memory and language, as evidenced by previous studies 
(Bruck & Melnyk, 2004), all the mentioned processes are related to metacognition, the 
cognition about cognition.  
Metacognitive skills are believed to play an important role in many types of 
cognitive activities, especially in the arena of learning. Despite of the considerable 
amount of research, relatively little is known about how the acquisitions translates into 
changes in children’s everday cognitive and social behaviors. Meanwhile, 
suggestibility could be redeemed as one type of learning information from the external 
sources. Although the result of misinformation effect is unwanted and negative, the 
process itself is adaptive. People are motivated to be accurate and be affiliated with 
other people (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Therefore, integrating information from 
other resources is natural and inevitable. In the developmental trajectory, children do 
not learn to reduce the detrimental impact of misinformation effect. Instead, they learn 
how to manage the process as a consequence of their improving metacognitive 
capacity. Therefore, there is reason to believe that metacognitive skills play an 
important role in suggestibility. If proven, there is also reason to carry out 
interventions directly to children to reduce the negative impact of suggestibility. 
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Thus a model highlighting the metacognition capacity is the focus of the current 
studies. Specifically, different aspects of children’s metacognitive capacity were 
examined as important individual difference factors related to suggestibility. It is 
expected that individual variation in these abilities, specifically metamemory (Chap 2), 
knowledge about narrative contexts (Chap 3), source monitoring (Chap 4) and 
knowledge about knowledge status (Chap 5) , can predict children’s suggestibility 
independent of age.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
METAMEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY: FULL PICTURE MAY ONLY BE 
OBTAINED BY FULL EXAMINATION 
Introduction 
Metamemory, the knowledge about memory and one’s own memory, is one 
important metacognitive process (Schneider, 1999). However, its role on suggestibility 
has received relatively little attention in the past research. In the current study, the 
relationship between metamemory and suggestibility was examined among preschool 
children, an age group easily susceptible to suggestibility. 
There are two types of metamemory: declarative metamemory and procedural 
metamemory (Schneider, 1999; cf. Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). Declarative 
metamemory refers to the explicit and conscious knowledge about memory such as 
knowing the influential factors on memory performance, usually measured without 
concurrent memory activities. In contrast, procedural metamemory involves the 
implicit and unconscious knowledge about memory, specifically the monitoring and 
regulating the on-line memory activities.  
The development of declarative metamemory extends throughout childhood but 
some metamemory is already available in preschool children. Preschool-aged children 
not only understand the memory related concepts (e.g., “forget”) from a linguistic 
perspective (Macnamara, Baker, Olson, 1976), but also start to understand the mental 
processes associated with the concepts and related factors (e.g., amount of information 
to remember, Kreutzer, Leonard, Flavell, & Wagen, 1975; encoding time, Wellman, 
1977; and time delay, Lyon & Flavell, 1993). For example, 5-year-olds rather than 3- 
and 4-year-olds understand that to remember/forget is associated with previously 
acquired knowledge (Wellman & Johnson, 1979). On the other hand, metamemory 
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development is more salient in school years. For example, children cannot master the 
knowledge such as related items, rather than unrelated items, would lead to false 
memories until the age of 6 (Jaswal & Dodson, 2009). Similarly, children younger 
than 9 failed to make memorability judgments on events (Ghetti & Alexander, 2004). 
In addition, preschoolers tend to believe that memory cannot be altered by 
misinformation or retroactive interference (O’Sullivan, Howe & Marche, 1996). 
Different types of procedural metamemory occur at different stages of memory 
such as judgments of learning (JOL) occurring at the stage of learning (Koriat, 1997). 
Among them, confidence judgments operate during the retrieval stage (Nelson, 1996; 
Schneider, 1999), the stage related to suggestibility. In general, the relationship 
between confidence and accuracy can be indexed by discrimination (or resolution), 
over-underconfidence and calibration (Brewer & Wells, 2006). Discrimination refers 
to whether people report confidence at different levels between correct answers and 
incorrect answers. Adults show better discrimination than school-aged children 
(Roebers, 2002), who demonstrate better discrimination than preschoolers (Roebers, 
2002; Roebers & Howe, 2003). Good discrimination becomes salient during the late 
elementary school years (Pressley, Levin, Ghatala, & Ahmad, 1987). Over-
/underconfidence is the tendency to over- or underestimate one’s own performance. 
Generally speaking, individuals of all ages are overconfident about their memory 
performance and young children are no exception (Allwood, Granhag, & Jonsson, 
2006; Lipko, Dunlosky, & Merriman, 2009). Last, calibration indicates how people 
match different levels of their subjective confidence ratings with their actual accuracy. 
Children’s metacognitive monitoring judgments about their answers to unbiased 
questions can be appropriately calibrated (Howie & Roebers, 2007).  
Metamemory has been postulated to contribute to the memory performance. The 
memorial behaviors may be under the influence of metamemory and have an impact 
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on the memory outcome. For example, it has been suggested that the belief in prenatal 
memory might be associated with the behavior of seeking the recovery of prenatal 
memory through therapy (Garry, Loftus, & Brown, 1994). Previous studies have 
indicated a moderate relationship between metamemory and memory performance. 
For example, a meta-analysis revealed an overall correlation of .41 (Schneider & 
Pressley, 1997). In contrast, some researchers believe that we shall not assume the 
relationship between metamemory and memory performance because the impaired 
memory performance could be either due to knowledge deficiency or the utilization 
deficiency (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). Under the circumstance that the demand 
of memory accuracy is low, people may not apply their declarative metamemory into 
utilization (utilization deficiency) despite of their occupancy of the corresponding 
declarative metamemory (knowledge deficiency).  
However, the existent studies on the relationship between metamemory and 
memory performance have mainly focused on only one aspect of metamemory 
(declarative metamemory). It is unknown how the relationship is between memory and 
the two aspects of metamemory. The current study is aimed at filling this gap.  
Furthermore, most previous studies on the metamemory-memory relationship 
have examined predominantly the remembering part of memory performance. 
Relatively few have explored when memory fails to function properly, for example, 
being distorted following postevent misleading information. Young children are 
generally highly susceptible to suggestibility (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 
1993). Therefore, it is unclear whether the association between metamemory and 
memory would be generalized to suggestibility. Few studies have examined this 
relationship. In a study, declarative metamemory was measured in an interview with 
preschool children and the scores of metamemory were compared with their 
performance in a suggestibility task (Geddie, Fradin, & Beer, 2000). However, five 
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out of the eight interview questions focused on short-term memory and memory 
strategies. Concerning the process of misinformation effect, this type of metamemory 
may play a rather small role. This is consistent with their finding that this type of 
metamemory is positively associated with total recall but not with responses to 
misleading questions. They found a trend between metamemory and suggestibility in 
correlation analysis but not in regressions. Declarative metamemory contributed to 6% 
of the variance in total recall but no significant contributions to resistance to 
misleading questions. Therefore, in the current study, children’s declarative 
metamemory about general memory system and possible factors to contaminate 
memory were examined. 
In the current study, both declarative and procedural metamemory were examined 
in terms of the relationship with suggestibility. An interview was developed following 
Wellman (1977) to explore declarative metamemory in preschoolers. Children were 
asked to make choices between pairs of dolls, portrayed in different memory-related 
situations. For procedural metamemory, children reported confidence judgments in a 
neutral memory interview. Child participants were asked unbiased, specific questions 
about a story they had previously heard and indicated how sure they were of the 
correctness of each answer. Last, suggestibility was examined with the Video 
Suggestibility Scale for Children (VSSC) (Scullin & Ceci, 2001). This is a 
measurement specifically designed for preschool children. Following its precedent 
Gudjosson Suggestibility Scale (Gudjonsson, 1984), the advantage of the scale is that 
it allows measuring two types of suggestive questions (Yield and Shift). Usually, 
Yield is redeemed as the cognitive aspect of suggestibility whereas Shift indicates 
social aspect manipulated through negative feedback. The link between declarative 
metamemory and suggestibility would be explored considering the debates over the 
existence of the association. In addition, it was predicted that the worse the child can 
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monitor the memory performance, the more likely she or he is susceptible to others’ 
misinformation. 
Method 
Participants  
Fifty-six children (29 girls, 27 boys) recruited from four local day care centers 
and preschools participated. Their ages ranged from 37 months to 71 months (M = 
51.89 months, SD = 8.80 months). The children were predominantly European 
Americans (n = 48), with a few children of Asian American (n =6), African American 
(n =1) and multiethnic (n =1). An additional 2 children were dropped from the 
analyses due to out of the age range (85 month and 90 month) of the research interest. 
Written consent was obtained from each child’s parent or legal guardian prior to the 
beginning of the study. Each child received a toy after the study. 
Procedure 
Trained research assistants interviewed the child in each school. The two tasks 
were carried out by different research assistants who had been trained specifically for 
that task. Prior to the research sessions, the interviewers visited the children’s 
classrooms to acclimate with the children.  
Suggestibility 
Children first watched a 5-minute video “Billy’s Birthday Party” in a quiet 
area in their school individually, occasionally in the group of two (Schullin & Ceci, 
2001). The video included unexpected events such as fire alarm and  some clumsy 
behaviors (falling down, broken toy and dropping a cake). The VSSC interview was 
administered at least one day after the video. The duration between the video and 
interview ranged from 1 to 21 days (M = 4.20, Median = 3.00, SD = 3.78). Two open-
ended non-leading questions (e.g., “Who was at the party?”) and two non-leading 
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probe questions (e.g. “What happened when the children opened the presents?”) were 
asked first as a memory recall test. Then children were asked 18 yes/no leading 
questions (e.g., “Did the two girls arrive at the party in a bright red car?”). After the 
first 9 questions, ambiguous negative feedback was given (“You have made a few 
mistakes.  Let’s go over the questions again and see if you can do better.”) and the 
questions were repeated. The same procedure applied to the second 9 questions.  
Children’s responses were audio taped and transcribed verbatim for scoring. 
The memory recall test was scored following the scoring schema of VSSC. In general, 
children received 1 point for mentioning one of the scoring unit listed in the scoring 
schema. The number of affirmation to the inaccurate leading questions were counted 
as Yield, and the number of changing answers between “yes” and “no” (including “I 
don’t know” and “no response”) was counted as Shift. The highest possible Yield 
score is 14 (because the correct answers for 4 of the 18 questions were “yes”), and the 
highest possible Shift score is 18. 
Metamemory 
The interview followed a similar procedure previously used in preschool 
children (Wellman, 1977). Child participants were first introduced two dolls in the 
same gender of child participants as brothers (or sisters) whose mother held a few 
memory contests between them. They were asked to judge the winner between the two 
who varied in factors related with memory. The two rememberers differed in one of 
the aspects as shown in Table 2.1. Each correct answer was scored 1. Their responses 
were scored 0 whenever they answered the questions incorrectly or indicated that the 
answer was based on guessing or preference to one of the two dolls.  
Declarative Metamemory 
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Reliability analysis showed that all the items had strong positive correlations 
with the total scale (r’s = .43 to .64) and formed a reliability scale (Cronbach’s α = .77) 
The interviewer read the child participants a story book “Bryan’s Friday” 
prepared especially for the current study (for girls, “Emily’s Friday”). After the story 
was over, child participants were briefly asked for opinions of the character in the 
story. Then children were informed that they would be asked questions about the story. 
They were trained to use the face scale to indicate their confidence. Following the 
result of a pilot study, a 3-point scale was used for children of this age. Children were 
instructed to point to the happy face when they were very sure, neutral face (referred 
as “blank/nothing face”  in the study) when they were neither sure nor unsure, and sad 
face when they were not sure. A minimum of two practice questions (“What did you 
eat for breakfast?” “What did I eat for breakfast?”) were asked for children to 
understand the correct way to rate their confidence with the face scale. The meaning 
for different faces was explained to children again if they failed to differentiate the 
two practice questions. Similar pair of practice questions were asked with more 
detailed instructions provided if the children failed to respond correctly.  
Procedural Metamemory 
Then children were asked 18 questions in an unbiased format on the critical 
activities in the order presented in the story. After giving their answers, children were 
asked to estimate their certainty of accuracy with the face scale. No confidence rating 
was required if the child answered “I don’t know”. We scored 0 for sad face, not sure, 
1 for neutral face, neither unsure nor sure, and 2 for happy face, sure. 
Calibration, over-/underconfidence and discrimination were calculated 
respectively following the formulas recommended by Brewer and Wells (2006).  
When calculating calibration, confidence levels shall be within the range of 0 
to 1. As a result, we first assigned 0, 0.5, and 1 to sad face, neutral face, and happy 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 
Declarative Metamemory Interview Questions 
Items Correct 
choice 
Incorrect 
choice 
1. Amount of information to learn Small Large 
2. Encoding Gist Verbatim 
3. Chunk Yes No 
4. Encoding time Short Long 
5. Allocation of study time based on the content of 
material 
Yes No 
6. Interval after encoding Short Long 
7. Rehearsal Yes No 
8. Retrieval with a cue Yes No 
9. Information chracteristics Central Peripheral 
10. Experience of retroactive interference No Yes 
11. Experience of suggestibility No Yes 
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face responses, respectively. Then we used the formula as followed, where aj denotes 
proportion of correct responses at confidence level j, cj is the mean of the confidence 
ratings in confidence level j, nj 
  ∑n
is the number of times the confidence level j was used, 
and n denotes the total number of questions: 
j (cj - aj)2
The range of calibration is between 0 and 1, with a greater score indicating 
better calibration. 
/n.  
Over-/underconfidence was computed as the difference between mean 
confidence and overall proportion correct. It varies from -1 to 1, with negative values 
indicating underconfidence and positive values indicating overconfidence. 
Discrimination was calculated with the following formula, where a denotes the 
average accuracy score: 
 ∑nj (aj - a)2
Discrimination ranges between 0 and 1, with a greater value indicating a better 
resolution between correct and incorrect answers.  
/na(1-a). 
Results 
Preliminary analysis found no effect of gender on accuracy of recall and two 
aspects of metamemory, thus was not considered further. 
Descriptive Analyses 
 In the suggestibility task (VSSC), children correctly provided 1.50 items (SD = 
1.93)  in free recall test. They on average scored 8.02 (SD = 3.96) for Yield and 5.07 
(SD = 3.57) for Shift. The delay between video watching and memory test was 
associated with Shift, r(56) = .25, p = .06, at a marginally significant level.    
 Due to the interviewer error or low interest of the child participant, a small 
amount (n =18) of the declarative metamemory questions were not asked. Therefore, a 
percentage score instead of the sum was calculated to indicate the overall performance. 
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The average score of the declarative metamemory was 0.48 (SD = 0.27, range = 0 – 
0.90), not differently from chance level, t (54) = 0.56, p = .58.  
 In the recognition test related with confidence judgment, the average 
percentage of correct answers was 0.54 (SD = 0.15, range = 0.22-0.94). The average 
confidence rating was 1.56 (SD = 0.41) for all the answers, 1.72 (SD = 0.39) for 
correct answers and 1.38 (SD = 0.50) for incorrect answers. Child participants 
reported higher confidence for correct answers than for incorrect answers, t (54) = 
6.12, p < .001, d = .76.  
 The average score of calibration was 0.15 (SD = 0.10, range = 0-0.44), with the 
conceptualized range between 0 (perfect calibration) and 1 (no calibration). The 
average score of over-/underconfidence was 0.24 (SD = 0.20, range = -0.17-0.67), 
with the conceptualized range between -1(underconfidence) and 1(overconfidence). 
The average score of discrimination was 0.20 (SD = 0.24, range = 0-1), with the 
conceptualized range between 0 (no discrimination) and 1(perfect discrimination). 
Metamemory and Suggestibility 
 The correlational analyses on declarative metamemory only revealed the 
association with Shift (Table 2.1). Children with better declarative metamemory 
tended to shift their answers following the negative feedback. Declarative 
metamemory appeared to be independent of age, memory, and Yield. The correlation 
analyses on procedural metamemory and suggestibility found association between 
Yield and two indices (over-/underconfidence and calibration) (Table 2.2). Those who 
could not calibrate their confidence ratings very well tended to yield to misleading 
questions. On the other hand, those who overestimated their performance were more 
likely to yield to misleading questions. The ability to report differentially between 
correct answers and incorrect answers was not associated with any variable of interest 
but the other two indices of procedural metamemory.  
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Table 2.2 
Correlations between VSSC, Age, and  Metamemory 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Yield  - -.21 -.39*** -.21 .13 -.19 .35** .29* 
2. Shift  - .03 .24 .31* # -.16 -.06 -.13 
3. Free recall   - .29* -.14 -.001 -.02 -.09 
4. Age    - -.07 -.09 -.19 -.13 
5. Declarative Metamemory     - .20 -.03 -.16 
6. Discrimination      - -.27* -.35** 
7. Over-/Underconfidence       - .67*** 
8. Calibration        - 
#
Note. The  possible range of calibration is between 0 (perfect calibration) and 1 (no 
calibration); the possible range of over-/underconfidence is between -1 
(underconfidence) and 1(overconfidence). The possible range of discrimination is 
between 0 (no discrimination) and 1(perfect discrimination). 
 p < .10, * p < .05, **  p < .01,  ***  p < .005. 
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Multiple regression models were conducted to examine the role metamemory 
has played in suggestibility, compared with other individual factors. The results of 
these analyses are presented in Table 2.3. Procedural metamemory (over-
/underconfidence and calibration, respectively) and the memory about the video 
independently contributed to the number of yields to misleading questions. In contrast, 
declarative metamemory, age and the interval of the video watching and memory test 
inVSSC test independently had an impact on the number of shifts. 
Discussion 
 The current study was the first study to examine the two aspects of 
metamemory (declarative and procedural) and suggestibility. Within the range of 
preschool ages, younger children were less resistant to misleading questions but more 
resistant to negative feedback than older children. Higher procedural metamemory was 
associated with less yielding to misleading questioning whereas higher declarative 
metamemory seemed to be associated with more shifting answers upon negative 
feedback. 
Consistent with the previous findings (Kreutzer, et al., 1975), preschool 
children only have limited and rudimentary declarative knowledge about memory. 
They answered fewer than half of the questions correctly, similar to guessing. Also 
consistent with some researchers’ argument(Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982), the 
association between declarative metamemory and memory is very weak. The 
utilization deficiency is evident among preschool children in that better knowledge 
about the factors related to memory did not lead to better memory. Instead, it has been 
suggested that the usage of declarative metamemory is related to various motivational 
and resource-allocation factors (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). When situation is 
appropriate (e.g., memory goal is strongly desired), a high correlation might be  
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Table 2.3 
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Suggestibility from Metamemory 
Criterion Predictors β t R2 
Yield Model 1:   .28**** 
 Free recall  -.39 -3.31***  
 Over-/Underconfidence .35 2.93***  
Yield Model 2:   .22*** 
 Free recall -.37 -3.04***  
 Calibration .26 2.11*  
Shift Model 3:   .25*** 
 Age .27 2.25*  
 Duration .29 2.40*  
 Declarative Metamemory .35 2.88**  
* p < .05, **  p < .01,  ***  p < .005, **** p < .001. 
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expected. In the current case, when children were given some negative feedback, 
children who had an advanced knowledge were more likely to shift their answers. 
 In terms of procedural metamemory, children in the age range studied showed 
some but not very satisfactory discrimination in their confidence ratings between 
correct and incorrect answers (Roebers, 2002; Roebers & Howe, 2003). They were 
also overestimating their memory performance (Allwood, et al., 2006; Lipko, et al., 
2009). On the other hand, with the age-appropriate 3-point scale, they demonstrated 
pretty good calibration, matching their subjective confidence ratings with their actual 
performance. We failed to find the relationship between age and metamemory, either 
declarative or procedural, in the limited age range, which is consistent with previous 
studies showing more salient improvements during school years (Kreutzer, et al., 1975; 
Pressley, et al., 1987).  
 Consistent with previous studies (Roebers, 2002, study 1; Roebers & Howie, 
2003), memory and the differentiation in procedural metamemory appear to be two 
independent processes when the interview was carried out in an unbiased way. 
Nevertheless, the procedural metamemory was associated with resistance to  
 misleading questions. Those children who had worse ability to monitor their own 
performance, either by being too optimistic or failing to match their feelings with 
actual performance, were more easily susceptible to misleading questions.  
 The findings suggest that it is important to compare the two aspects to acquire 
a better knowledge about the relationship between metamemory and suggestibility. In 
addition, the measurement of suggestibility may also not be limited to yielding to 
misleading questions. As in the current study, if only the declarative metamemory and 
Yield was examined, we would replicate previous findings (Geddie, et al., 2000) that 
the relationship between metamemory and suggestibility is very weak. This, however, 
loses the whole image of the relationship as revealed in the current study that: a) 
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declarative memory plays an important and independent role when the memory goal is 
high by providing negative feedback; and b) the possibility of yielding to misleading 
questions is associated with the procedural metamemory that those who had better 
ability to monitor their own performance can better resist to suggestive interviews. 
 The current study has some limitations. First, the validity of the declarative 
metamemory interview specially designed for the current study, focusing mainly on 
the factors related to long-term memory, needs to be further examined. For example, it 
is difficult to guarantee that children were attending to the questions, which might be 
lengthy for their age. Future research can involve fact-checking questions or just 
repeating the descriptions . Retests might also be needed (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 
1982). 
 The current study thus provides some evidence that there is some association 
between metamemory and suggestibility by examining both the declarative and 
procedural aspect of metamemory and not limiting the study of suggestibility as 
yielding to misleading questions. Specifically, the link between metamemory and 
suggestibility is moderate and independent of memory and age. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
GROWING PAINS: BETTER KNOWLEDGE ABOUT NARRATIVE CONTEXT, 
HIGHER SUGGESTIBILITY  
Introduction 
 In the past decades, age has been suggested to be the largest source of variance 
in suggestibility studies during childhood (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Bruck & Ceci, 1999). 
Most of time, younger children, such as preschoolers, are more easily susceptible to 
misleading information than older children (for exceptions, see Brainerd, Reyna, & 
Ceci, 2008). Nevertheless, many improvements, both cognitive and social, have been 
made with age. On one hand, children become more competent in memory, thus less 
confused between the suggested information and the original event (Templeton & 
Wilcox, 2000). On the other hand, children become more competent in social 
interactions. They gain various social knowledge, such as the way to be a good 
narrator in different contexts. It is important to identify the specific developmental 
changes that are associated with suggestibility. The current study was to fulfill this 
goal by exploring the relationship between the increment with knowledge about 
narrative context and suggestibility. 
 Recollection is far more than a process of retrieval information from storage 
(Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). The narrative 
context may also affect individuals’ reports. People may be motivated to provide 
information as much as possible, or as accurate as possible, or just to meet the 
audience’s expectation. Through the developmental path, individuals learn how to 
differentiate and respond correspondingly between various narrative contexts.  
 Young children fail to spontaneously discriminate between narrative contexts 
requiring quantity of information like free recall or quality of information like legal 
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related interview, which has been attributed as one explanation for their high 
susceptibility to misinformation. Most of time, children may feel pressured to provide 
maximum information instead of high quality of information. Young children tend to 
provide some answers even when the question itself is implausible to answer, 
especially when the question is in the closed format (Beuscher & Roebers, 2005; 
Peterson, Dowden, & Tobin, 1999; Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2000). For example, 
when answering questions about a story, preschool children provided fewer correct 
answers to unanswerable wh- questions than school-aged children (Waterman, Blades, 
& Spencer, 2001).   
 Previous studies related with knowledge about narrative context and 
suggestibility were mainly intervention studies, where the focus on quality of the 
narrative context was highlighted by various means such as coaching to acknowledge 
“I don’t know”, rewarding accurate answers, and discussing the importance of being 
acquiescent when appropriate prior to memory interview (Mulder & Vrij, 1996; 
Roebers, & Fernandez, 2002; Roebers & Schneider, 2005; Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, 
1994; Seidler & Howie, 1999). Following the manipulation, children increased 
responses with “I don’t know” and accuracy for the misleading questions was boosted. 
In conclusion, when the accuracy demand in narrative context is salient, children may 
resist misinformation. However, immediate feedback and reward with token, as the 
focus in the previous studies, do not naturally occur in the legal contexts. In addition, 
it is unclear about the role of knowledge on narrative context as an individual 
difference in suggestibility. The current study was expected to fill in the gap.  
 The research question is whether children with better knowledge of narrative 
context are less influenced by the misleading questions. In the current study, 
individual differences of interrogative suggestibility, the tendency to accept the 
misinformation during the interview, were examined with the Video Suggestibility 
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Scale for Children (VSSC) (Scullin & Ceci, 2001), a measurement specially designed 
for preschool children. Unlike previous intervention studies on narrative context, in 
VSSC, no ground rules were provided prior to the interview. That is, the demand on 
the quality was not highlighted in this specific narrative context. There are two 
subscales, Yield (assenting to misleading questions) and Shift (changing response 
upon negative ambiguous feedback). Yield and Shift reflect different mechanisms 
underlying suggestibility. The underlying mechanism involved in suggestibility might 
be both social and cognitive. On one hand, people may be subjected to misleading 
interviews due to their weak memory strength. On the other hand, people may just 
report what they assume an interviewer wishes them to report. In VSSC, Yield focuses 
more on the cognitive mechanisms (memory taint) whereas Shift reflects more on the 
social mechanism. Considering the knowledge about narrative context is more related 
with the social interactions, I expect it would have a greater influence on Shift than 
Yield. Shift was measured by repeated interview following mild negative feedback, 
which appeared to emphasize the “expectation” of the interviewer. Those who possess 
a better knowledge about the narrative context might capture the signal much more 
easily than those who are less competent in judging the appropriate responses in the 
narrative context. Therefore, I expect that the knowledge about narrative context, 
acquired with age, would be associated with high Shift.  
Method 
Participants  
Fifty-four children (29 girls, 25 boys) recruited from four local day care 
centers and preschools participated. Their ages ranged from 37 months to 71 months 
(M = 51.98 months, SD = 8.80 months). The children were predominantly European 
Americans (n = 46), with a few of Asian American (n =6), African American (n =1) 
and multiethnic (n =1). An additional 4 children were dropped from the analyses for 
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either failure to complete the interview protocol due to lack of interest (n =2) or out of 
the age range (85 month and 90 month) of the research interest. Written consent was 
obtained from each child’s parent or legal guardian prior to the beginning of the study. 
Each child received a toy after the study. 
Procedure 
Trained research assistants interviewed the child in each school. The two tasks 
were carried out by different research assistants who had been trained specifically for 
that task. Prior to the research sessions, the interviewers visited the children’s 
classrooms to acclimate with the children. The order between the memory test and 
source-monitoring assessment varied among children. 
Suggestibility 
Children first watched a 5-minute video “Billy’s Birthday Party” in a quiet 
area in their school individually, occasionally in the group of two (Schullin & Ceci, 
2001). The video included unexpected events such as fire alarm and  some clumsy 
behaviors (falling down, broken toy and dropping a cake). The VSSC interview was 
administered at least one day after the video. The duration between the video and 
interview ranged from 1 to 21 days (M = 4.34, Median = 3.00, SD = 3.84). Two open-
ended non-leading questions (e.g., “Who was at the party?”) and two non-leading 
probe questions (e.g. “What happened when the children opened the presents?”) were 
asked first as a memory recall test. Then children were asked 18 yes/no leading 
questions (e.g., “Did the two girls arrive at the party in a bright red car?”). After the 
first 9 questions, ambiguous negative feedback was given (“You have made a few 
mistakes.  Let’s go over the questions again and see if you can do better.”) and the 
questions were repeated. The same procedure applied to the second 9 questions.  
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Children’s responses were audio taped and transcribed verbatim for scoring. 
The memory recall test was scored following the scoring schema of VSSC. In general, 
children received 1 point for mentioning one of the scoring unit listed in the scoring 
schema. The number of affirmation to the inaccurate leading questions were counted 
as Yield, and the number of changing answers between “yes” and “no” (including “I 
don’t know” and “no response”) was counted as Shift. The highest possible Yield 
score is 14 (because the correct answers for 4 of the 18 questions were “yes”), and the 
highest possible Shift score is 18. 
Narrative Knowledge  
Children heard brief scenarios between two characters (shown with two similar 
dolls in the gender of the child participant) answering questions and chose the one 
whose answer they liked. There were five pairs of comparison, with the correct answer 
counterbalanced between the two characters. The comparisons were: “I don’t know” 
vs. guessing in forced choice; “I don’t know” vs. acquiescence; no information vs. 
making up an answer; shifting originally correct answer vs. maintaining original 
answer; and taking the audience’s perspective into account vs. not considering the 
audience’s perspective (see Appendix for interview questions). Interviewers repeated 
the scenarios to make sure that children understand and remember the different 
answers.  
Children’s responses to the questions were scored 1 whenever they answered 
correctly. Their responses were scored 0 whenever they answered the questions 
incorrectly or indicated that the answer was based on guessing or preference to one of 
the two characters. Reliability analysis showed that the 5 items had strong positive 
correlations with the total scale (rs = .51 to .72) and the internal consistency is 
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moderate (Cronbach’s α = .55). The scores were aggregated to index the children’s 
knowledge about narrative context.   
Results 
Preliminary analysis found no effect of gender thus gender was not considered 
further. 
Descriptive Analyses 
 Children correctly provided 1.56 items (SD = 1.94)  in free recall test. They on 
average scored 7.93 (SD = 3.95) for Yield and 5.11 (SD = 3.59) for Shift. Children on 
average scored 2.67 (SD = 1.48) for narrative knowledge, not significantly better than 
chance level, t (53) = 0.83, p = 0.41. Table 3.1 displays the frequency of accuracy of 
each of the five questions measuring narrative knowledge.  
 Table 3.2 presents the correlations between memory (Yield, Shift, and free 
recall), narrative knowledge and age measured in months. Older children recalled 
more information and had better narrative knowledge than younger children. 
Children’s Shift was significantly associated with narrative knowledge score, age and 
interval between video showing and misleading interview. Yield was significantly 
negatively associated with free recall and age. There were marginal significant 
negative associations between Yield and Shift, and between narrative knowledge and 
free recall.  
Narrative Knowledge as an Independent Predictor 
 The main question here was whether the narrative knowledge predicted 
suggestibility. The results of the correlational analyses suggest that the narrative 
knowledge was associated with suggestibility by increasing the number of shifts in the 
interview. Interestingly, age plays a similar role in the number of shifts whereas  
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Table 3.1 
Percentage of Accuracy for Components of Narrative Knowledge 
Measure Accuracy (%) 
“I don’t know” vs. guessing 41 
“I don’t know” vs. acquiescence 44 
No answer vs. making-up 57 
Maintaining original answer vs. yielding 57 
Taking the audience’s perspective 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 
Correlations between Memory, Age, and Narrative Knowledge 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Yield  - -.18 -.38** # 0 -.24* .02 
2. Shift  - .02 .25* .28* .27* 
3. Free recall   - .08 .29* -.22
4. Interval 
# 
   - -.05 -.14 
5. Age     - .24* 
6. Narrative knowledge      - 
#
 
 p < .10, * p < .05, **  p < .01 . 
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narrative knowledge increases with age. A further question is to examine whether the 
influence of narrative knowledge onto shifts is just covaried with age. 
 A hierarchical linear regression was thus carried out. At Step 1, age, Yield, and  
interval between original event and memory test were entered as predictors of shifts. 
At Step 2, narrative knowledge was added to the model. The first model, excluding 
narrative knowledge, was significant, F (3, 53) = 3.16, p = .03 (see Table 3.3). Both 
age and interval were significantly independent predictors of Shift. When narrative 
knowledge was added to the model, the model became more significant, F (4, 53) 
=3.58, p = .01. Narrative knowledge was a significant predictor of Shift. To note, the 
influence of age on Shift was reduced to a non-significant level. The change in R2
Discussion 
 was 
also significant, F (1, 53) = 4.24, p = .04.  
 The present study examined how individual differences in the knowledge of 
narrative context would contribute to preschool children’s suggestibility. Age and  
knowledge of narrative context were found to be associated with children’s 
performance. On one hand, older children recalled more information and were less 
likely to yield to misleading questions. On the other hand, consistent with previous 
finding (Scullin & Ceci, 2001), older preschool children were more likely to change 
their answers in repeated questions following negative feedback. Further analyses 
indicated that the knowledge about narrative context, which increases with age, plays 
an independent role in increasing the tendency of changing answers. This is consistent 
with the results from the intervention studies that the influence of training to 
acknowledge “I don’t know” in reducing suggestibility was independent of age 
(Mulder & Vrij, 1996). 
Preschool children are still in the process of gaining narrative knowledge. They 
answered questions no better than chance level. From two questions in the interview, 
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Table 3.3 
Hierarchical Linear Regression Predicting Shift from Interval, Age, Yield and 
Narrative Knowledge 
Variables β t R2 
Model 1:   .16* 
Age .26 2.00  # 
Interval .26 2.02*  
Yield -.12 -0.87  
Model 2:   .23* 
Age .20 1.46  
Interval .30 2.33*  
Yield -.14 -1.05  
Narrative knowledge .27 2.06*  
#
 
 p <.10, * p < .05. 
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children demonstrated the tendency of providing some answers rather than 
ackowledging “I don’t know”. Notably, different from previous studies (Waterman, et 
al., 2000, 2001), children in the current study were not required to answer the question 
by themselves but rather to choose their preferred speaker. Therefore, children were 
expected to confront much less pressure as in answering questions in person in 
interviews. However, the tendency was still prevalent in preschool children. It is 
possible that the narrative contexts, such as mother-child conversations, that require 
quantity of information are the dominant type of narrative contexts among 
preschoolers. When the formal education starts, children will be introduced the test-
type narrative context that highlights the demand on the accuracy of information.  
  Measured in the current interview, children who master the knowledge about 
narrative context are those who can tell the difference between the conditions 
expecting quantity and quality and the expectation of the audience. Equipped with this 
knowledge, they are more likely to be able to spontaneously adjust their narration to fit 
the demand of the context, based on their judgments (Roebers & Fernandez, 2002). In 
the present study, the interviewer watched the video together with children. In addition, 
no ground rule emphasizing accuracy was provided. Combined with repeated 
questioning and negative feedback, children who master the knowledge about 
narrative context may easily conclude that changing answers is the demand of the 
current interactions. In contrast, the knowledge about narrative context appeared to 
have no influence on the tendency to comply the answers, which is consistent with the 
the fact that Yield is more associated with the original memory strength. This is 
consistent with previous findings that merely providing the opportunity to say “I don’t 
know” (vs. with reward) does not make significant impact in improving memory 
accuracy (Roebers, Moga, & Schneider, 2001).  
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 Despite of the interesting finding revealed in the current study, it calls for more 
empirical evidence. First of all, the current study only focused on preschool children. 
Previous studies have found that preschool children change answers more often than 
school-aged children, especially to yes-no questions (Cassel, Robers, & Bjorklund, 
1996; Poole & White, 1991). Thus it is important to expand the age range to school-
aged children.  A wide age range may provide a detailed and accurate picture of the 
relationship between age and suggestibility. How narrative knowledge plays a role in 
the relationship then becomes more intriguing. Second, the current study suggested 
that the difference of the performance across situations with different narrative 
demands (quality vs. quantity) might be more salient in children with a better narrative 
knowledge. Empirical studies varying the demands in the narrative context may help 
to examine the suggested relationship. Third, it is interesting to explore the process 
and influential factors for people to judge the demand of the narrative context. Last, 
the moderate reliability of the measurement on the narrative knowledge also needs to 
be further improved.  
 Although the misinformation effect leads to many unwanted problems in legal 
contexts and our daily life, it cannot be denied that misinformation effect is one of the 
natural processes of people’s interaction in the social world. People shall tune their 
responses to meet the demand of the narrative context, being accurate, elaborative or 
meeting the expectation of the audience. Children learn to be a good narrator in the 
social context and have to experience the growing pains by changing their answers to 
please the interviewer.   
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APPENDIX  
 
List of Narrative Knowledge Questions (for boys) 
John and Billy are brothers. Who do you like?  
 
Q1. “I don’t know” vs. guessing:  
 The teacher asked what an animal called a lemur looks like. She asked whether 
a lemur looks like a monkey or like a cat. Neither John nor Billy knew about it. John 
answered, “I don’t know”. Billy guessed an answer. Whose answer do you like? 
 
Q2. “I don’t know” vs. acquiescence:  
 This time, the teacher asked what a plant called coleus looks like. She asked 
whether a coleus looks like pineapple. Neither John nor Billy knew about it. John said 
“yes”. Billy answered “I don’t know”. Whose answer do you like? 
 
Q3. No information vs. making-up:  
 The teacher asked who broke the window. Neither John nor Billy knew about 
it. John didn’t answer the question. Billy made it up and said Laura broke it. Whose 
answer do you like? 
 
Q4. Maintaining original answer vs. yielding:  
 One woman visited John and Billy’s house when their mother was out. When 
Mom came back, she asked whether the woman had a book in her hand. Both John 
and Billy said no at first. “Are you sure? Somebody with a book may visit us today.” 
Mother said. John said “yes, she had a book in her hand.” Billy said “no, she didn’t 
have a book in her hand.” Whose answer do you like? 
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Q5. Taking the audience’s perspective:  
 Sandy was blindfolded. At this moment, a dog entered the room, made some 
noise and left. Sandy heard some noise and asked John and Billy, “What’s wrong?”. 
John said “it left”. Billy said “the dog left”.  Whose answer do you like? 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE FLIP SIDE: SOURCE MONITORING MAY INCREASE SUGGESTIBILITY  
Introduction 
 The studies on children’s suggestibility are important to the applied issues in 
legal contexts as well as the theoretical issues in children’s cognitive and social 
development. Young children, especially preschoolers, are more easily susceptible to 
misleading information than older children and adults (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Bruck & 
Ceci, 1999; Goodman, 2006; for exceptions, see Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008). 
Suggestibility, although represented as a negative aspect of memory, is indeed a 
natural process in the social context (Foley, Passalacqua, & Ratner, 1993). Everyday, 
people incorporate information from different sources into their own memory, 
motivated to be not only accurate but also cooperative with co-narrators. At the same 
time that children develop their ability to be accurate, they also grow to be more 
cooperative. Therefore, factors may influence both the cognitive and social aspect of 
suggestibility. Source monitoring ability could be such a case, which was examined in 
the current study.   
 Source monitoring refers to the attribution the sources of their own 
representations (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Young children have great 
difficulty with different types of source monitoring (Roberts, 2002). For example, 
children have worse reality monitoring than adults. That is, they misattribute more 
easily an actual perceptual experience with internally generated representations, such 
as imagined experience and belief (Foley & Johnson, 1985; Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 
1983; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991). Preschool children also performed poorer in 
reality monitoring than school-aged children (Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Ottinger, 
2004). Another type of confusion emerges when differentiating two similar external 
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sources. Preschoolers had more difficulty than school-aged children and adults 
distinguishing information from similar sources, such as words spoken by two 
speakers (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Lindsay, et al., 1991; Poole & Lindsay, 
2001). The type of source monitoring specifically related with the process of 
suggestibility is the differentiation between their direct experience and another 
external source. Children gain their ability to identify the source of their knowledge 
during preschool years (O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). 
Young school-aged (6-year-old) children discriminate memories of what they have 
said from memories of what they have heard as well as older children (9-year-old) and 
adolescents (17-year-old) (Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983). 
 Compared with older children and adults, younger children have greater 
difficulty in differentiating their own life experience from suggested information from 
others (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995). They are more likely to claim actual seeing 
information that was only suggested to them. A link between suggestibility and source 
misattributions has been indicated. First of all, when preschool children have a better 
source memory about an event, they are more likely to resist to suggestion in the form 
of leading questions (Giles, Gopnik, & Heyman, 2002). Although suggestibility 
decreases and source monitoring accuracy increases with age, the relationship seems 
to be invariant with age. Along the same line, following training to think of the two 
external sources about the target event, preschool children are less suggestible to 
misleading interviews (Nesbitt & Markham, 1999; Thierry, Spence, & Memon, 2001; 
Thierry & Spence, 2002), mainly by reducing the false alarm rates. Furthermore, this 
kind of source monitoring intervention is more powerful than the detail-orientated 
memory training (Nesbitt & Markham, 1999; Giles, et al., 2002). Second, when source 
monitoring is measured with a task independent of the target event, the individual 
difference of source monitoring of preschool children contributes to the variation in 
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children’s suggestibility (Leichtman, Morse, Dixon, & Spiegel, 2000). Third, children 
benefit from the change of the question type into source-directed questions in the 
memory interview. For example, when source information is presented simultaneously 
in source-directed questions, even 3-year-olds are less likely to yield to misleading 
narratives than responding to classic recognition questions, as well as 6-year-olds 
(Bright-Paul, Jarrold, & Wright, 2005). 
  The studies reviewed support the contention that source monitoring ability 
serves as a resistant factor to suggestibility. However, those aforementioned studies 
have all focused exclusively on the suggestibility measured as yielding to misleading 
questions, which is worrisome. The other aspect of misleading interview such as 
inappropriate feedback and social pressure through repetitive questioning has been 
indicated to have a strong or even greater impact than simply suggestive questioning 
(Garven, Wood, Malpass, & Shaw, 1998). Based on the previous findings, the 
recommendation of adopting source monitoring intervention can be easily made to 
legal practitioners. However, it is hazardous under the condition that the relationship 
between source monitoring and suggestibility mainly due to social reasons remains 
unknown. The current study was dedicated to explore this issue. 
 The research question is whether children with better source monitoring ability 
are less suggestible in different measures varying in the focus on cognitive aspect vs. 
social aspect. In the current study, individual differences of interrogations 
suggestibility, the tendency to accept the misinformation during the interview, were 
examined with the Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (VSSC) (Scullin & Ceci, 
2001), a measurement specifically designed for preschool children. Following its 
precedent Gudjosson Suggestibility Scale (Gudjonsson, 1984), the advantage of the 
scale is that it allows measuring the impact of both cognitive and social aspect of 
suggestibility through two types of suggestive questions (Yield and Shift). Concerning 
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the subscale of Yield, the current study was expected to replicate the findings from 
previous studies that source monitoring plays a protective role in suggestibility. In 
terms of Shift, however, when the social demand is high, I predict those who can 
determine whether the source of information is the witness’ own event memory or the 
interviewer’s suggestive remarks are able to “correctly” answer their answer as 
“expected” from the interviewer. That is, they would shift answers more than those 
with worse source monitoring abilities. 
Method 
Participants  
Fifty-four children (29 girls, 25 boys) recruited from four local day care 
centers and preschools participated. Their ages ranged from 37 months to 71 months 
(M = 51.98 months, SD = 8.80 months). The children were predominantly European 
Americans (n = 46), with a few children of Asian American (n =6), African American 
(n =1) and multiethnic (n =1). An additional 4 children were dropped from the 
analyses for either failure to complete the interview protocol due to lack of interest (n 
=2) or out of the age range (85 month and 90 month) of the research interest. Written 
consent was obtained from each child’s parent or legal guardian prior to the beginning 
of the study. Each child received a toy after the study. 
Procedure 
Trained research assistants interviewed the child in each school. The two tasks 
were carried out by different research assistants who had been trained specifically for 
that task. Prior to the research sessions, the interviewers visited the children’s 
classrooms to acclimate with the children. The order between the memory test and 
source-monitoring assessment varied among children. 
 43 
Suggestibility 
Children first watched a 5-minute video “Billy’s Birthday Party” in a quiet 
area in their school individually, occasionally in the group of two (Schullin & Ceci, 
2001). The video included unexpected events such as fire alarm and  some clumsy 
behaviors (falling down, broken toy and dropping a cake). The VSSC interview was 
administered at least one day after the video. The duration between the video and 
interview ranged from 1 to 21 days (M = 4.34, Median = 3.00, SD = 3.84). Two open-
ended non-leading questions (e.g., “Who was at the party?”) and two non-leading 
probe questions (e.g. “What happened when the children opened the presents?”) were 
asked first as a memory recall test. Then children were asked 18 yes/no leading 
questions (e.g., “Did the two girls arrive at the party in a bright red car?”). After the 
first 9 questions, ambiguous negative feedback was given (“You have made a few 
mistakes.  Let’s go over the questions again and see if you can do better.”) and the 
questions were repeated. The same procedure applied to the second 9 questions.  
Children’s responses were audio taped and transcribed verbatim for scoring. 
The memory recall test was scored following the scoring schema of VSSC. In general, 
children received 1 point for mentioning one of the scoring unit listed in the scoring 
schema. The number of affirmation to the inaccurate leading questions were counted 
as Yield, and the number of changing answers between “yes” and “no” (including “I 
don’t know” and “no response”) was counted as Shift. The highest possible Yield 
score is 14 (because the correct answers for 4 of the 18 questions were “yes”), and the 
highest possible Shift score is 18. 
Source Monitoring 
The task followed a version of Gopnik and Graf’s (1988) task, designed for 
preschool children. Children either saw or were told about the content (picture card) in 
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6 different drawers. Each time, they were interviewed about the content (e.g., “What’s 
in the green drawer?”) and source (e.g., “How do you know what is in the green 
drawer? Did you see it or did I tell you about it?”). These two questions served as the 
immediate test for content and source, respectively. Regardless of the accuracy of their 
answer, the interviewer confirmed with the correct descriptions before moving on to 
the next item (e.g., “OK, You saw a cow in the green drawer.”) After this repeated for 
6 times, they were asked to put the picture cards back into their original drawers. After 
they put each picture card, they were asked about the same question about the source 
of the information (e.g., “How do you know this is in the green drawer? Did you see it 
or did I tell you about it?”). This served as the delayed test for content and source. 
Children received a score of 0-6 for each of the four source monitoring tasks.  
Results 
Preliminary analysis found no effect of gender and was not considered further. 
Descriptive Analyses 
 In the suggestibility task (VSSC), children correctly provided 1.56 items (SD = 
1.94) in free recall test. They on average scored 7.93 (SD = 3.95) for Yield and 5.11 
(SD = 3.59) for Shift.   
 In the source monitoring task, children correctly recalled the content of the 
drawer (M = 5.42, SD = 1.38) and source of the information (M = 5.45, SD = 1.03) in 
immediate task. In contrast, children could only recall part of the content of the drawer 
(M = 2.41, SD =1.74) and source of the information (M = 3.30, SD = 2.04) in the 
delayed task, which was not significantly different from chance level, t (53) = 1.07, p 
= 0.29. Table 4.1 presents the correlations between memory (Yield, Shift, and free 
recall), age in months, and source monitoring performance in four tasks (immediate 
content, immediate source, delayed content, and delayed source). In VSSC, older  
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Table 4.1 
Correlations between Memory, Age, and  Source Monitoring 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Yield  - -.18 -.38** # 0 -.24* .01 -.06 -.19 -.30* # 
2. Shift  - .02 .25* .28* -.06 -.03 .10 .41*** 
3. Free recall   - .08 .29* .03 -.05 .24* .20
4. Interval 
# 
   - -.05 -.15 -.35** .12 .21
5. Age 
# 
    - .05 .22 .31* # .18
6. Immediate content 
# 
     - .33** .02 -.10 
7. Immediate source       - -.12 -.09 
8. Delayed content        - .11 
9. Delayed source         - 
#
 
 p < .10, * p < .05, **  p < .01,  ***  p < .005. 
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both immediate and delayed tasks. Immediate content and source performance was 
also related. 
 Between source monitoring and suggestibility, recall performance in VSSC 
was correlated with delayed content memory and delayed source recall performance in 
source monitoring task, with the latter at a marginal level. Delayed source recall was  
negatively correlated with assents to misleading questions. There was a trend that 
delayed content memory was associated with greater resistance to yielding to 
suggestions. In the contrast, delayed source recall was positively correlated with 
shifting the answers.  
  Surprisingly, the interval between video showing and memory questioning in 
VSSC was negatively associated with immediate source recall performance and 
marginally related with delayed source recall performance.  
Source Monitoring as an Independent Predictor 
 The next question was whether the source monitoring predicted suggestibility. 
The results of the correlational analyses suggest that the performance in delayed 
source monitoring task was associated with suggestibility by decreasing the number of 
yields and increasing the number of shifts in the interview. Interestingly, age plays a 
similar role in Yield and Shift whereas source monitoring appears to be increasing 
with age. A further question is to examine whether the influence of source monitoring 
onto suggestibility is just covaried with age. 
 A hierarchical linear regression thus was carried out for yields and shifts, 
respectively. At Step 1 of the model for Yield, age and recall scores in VSSC were 
entered as predictors. At Step 2, source monitoring with the scores from the delayed 
task was added to the model. The first model, excluding source monitoring, was 
significant, F (2, 53) = 5.08, p = .01 (see Table 4.2). Memory about the video rather 
than age was significantly associated with fewer yields. In the second model, delayed  
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Table 4.2 
Hierarchical Linear Regression Predicting Yield from Age, Free Recall and Source 
Monitoring 
Variables β t R2 
Model 1:   .17* 
Age -.14 -1.07  
Free recall -.34 -2.57*  
Model 2:   .21** 
Age -.11 -.85  
Free recall -.31 -2.33*  
Delayed source monitoring -.22 -1.69  # 
#
 
 p <.10, * p < .05, ** p <.01. 
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source monitoring performance was a marginal predictor of Yield and the model 
became more significant, F (3, 53) = 4.45, p =.008. To note, the influence of memory 
on Yield was reduced. There was a trend that the change in R2
  A similar procedure was applied to Shift. At Step 1, age and interval between 
video and memory test were treated as predictors. At Step 2, delayed source score was 
added to the model. The first model without source monitoring was significant, F (2, 
53) = 4.38, p = .02 (see Table 4.3). Both age and interval were significantly 
independent predictors of Shift. When source monitoring was added to the model, the 
model became more significant, F (3, 53) = 5.34, p = .003. Remarkably, source 
monitoring became the only significant predictor of Shift. The change of R
 was significant, F (1, 
53) = 2.84, p =.10. 
2
Discussion 
 was also 
significant, F (1, 53) = 6.33, p = .02. 
 The current study was the first to examine the relationship between source 
monitoring and suggestibility upon social pressure as well as the traditional cognitive 
aspect of suggestibility of assenting to misinformation. Age and source monitoring 
were found to be associated with children’s performance in two types of suggestibility.  
 In terms of yielding to misinformation, we replicated previous findings that 
older children were less suggestible (Scullin & Ceci, 2001) and had better source 
monitoring ability (O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991; Wimmer, et al., 1988). Also, consistent 
with previous findings, better source monitoring appeared to be associated with 
greater resistance to yielding to suggested misinformation, independent of age 
(Leichtman, et al., 2000).  
 In addition to mnemonic factors, the subscale of Shift in the current study 
reflected the suggestibility packaged with different social factors such as authority (the 
interviewer watched the video together with children), repeated questioning and 
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Table 4.3 
Hierarchical Linear Regression Predicting Shift from Age, Interval, Yield and Source 
Monitoring 
Variables β t R2 
Model 1:   .15* 
Age .26 2.25*  
Interval .26 2.02*  
Model 2:   .24*** 
Age .23 1.82  # 
Interval .19 1.53  
Delayed source monitoring .32 2.52*  
#
 
 p <.10, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ** p < .005. 
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 negative feedback. Concerning changing answers, consistent with previous finding 
(Scullin & Ceci, 2001), older preschool children shifted their answers more often upon 
repeated questions following negative feedback. Further analyses indicated that the 
source monitoring, which increases with age, plays an independent role in increasing 
the tendency of changing answers. That is, children, who can monitor the sources of 
contradictory information between their own original memory and the interviewer’s 
suggestion, easily shift their answers to meet the demand of the interviewer.  
 The findings are important both to the legal contexts and theoretical issues in 
developmental psychology. A general assumption made in the published work has 
been that the ability of monitoring sources of one’s knowledge can help one resist 
false suggestions. However, for practitioners, the previous message of improving 
source monitoring to resist suggestibility is inadequate. Suggestibility encompasses 
both cognitive and social factors. The responsibility for reducing children’s 
suggestibility and increasing the accuracy of reports lies in the system rather than 
exclusively in children’s abilities. In addition to adopting procedures such as source 
monitoring sources, efforts should be made to reduce the interviewer bias to the 
minimum extent. The intervening in source monitoring only makes sense when 
children are interviewed in a non-misleading environment. Otherwise, the situation 
will turn out to be much worse, even than the condition without intervention. 
 For researchers, the findings also indicate that changes other than source 
monitoring between preschool age and school-age might be associated with the 
reduced suggestibility in the age range. In the current study focused on the preschool 
age range, older children were more likely to change their answers. However, beyond 
preschool age, younger children (6-year-olds) changed their answers upon repeated 
questioning more than older children (8-year-olds) and adults (Cassel & Bjorklund, 
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1995). More work is needed to discover the underlying mechanism for this reversed-U 
shaped development. 
 The current study also calls for more exploration on this topic. First, changing 
answers in repeated questions could be just the effect of social compliance rather than 
changing the mental representations (Bjorklund, Bjorklund, Brown, & Cassel, 1998). 
In the present study, we only focused on interrogative suggestibility, that is, the 
tendency to accept (mis)information during questioning. The result of the interrogative 
suggestibility remained unknown. It is very likely that those children with a better 
source monitoring ability, although changed their answers more frequently, later 
would still maintain a better memory toward the original event. Further studies may 
help to answer the question. Second, the age range may be expanded beyond preschool 
to involve school-aged children. Considering the tendency of shifting answers upon 
repeated questioning decreases from preschool children to school-aged children 
(Cassel, Robers, & Bjorklund, 1996; Poole & White, 1991), a better knowledge about 
the relationship between source monitoring and suggestibility may be obtained. Third, 
the results would be more compelling if a less biased interview had been included as a 
comparison. Fourth, in future studies, a source-monitoring test on memory for what 
was actually seen in the video could have been included. 
 A previous assumption about the relationship between source monitoring and 
suggestibility only focuses on the cognitive aspect of suggestibility that source 
monitoring serves as a resistant to suggestibility. The present study indicates that the 
relationship might depends on the social demand of the misleading interview. When 
the interview is highly biased, better source monitoring is associated with higher 
suggestibility.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT KNOWLEDGE AND SUGGESTIBILITY  
Introduction 
Much of our knowledge is gained from other informants. People accept 
information with evaluating its validity rather than unquestioningly. Researchers have 
recently started to examine how children evaluate the credibility of the informant 
(Miller, 2000). The relationship between preschool children’s knowledge about 
knowledge and their suggestibility in a memory task is the focus of the present study.  
There are two types of evaluations on other people’s knowledge status (Miller, 
2000). The first is a temporary, situational judgment, such as the immediate 
relationship between perceptual experience and knowledge status and the confidence 
shown by the informant. Eighteen-month infants already demonstrate an implicit 
understanding of the relationship between visual perception and knowledge status 
(Poulin-Dubois, Sodian, Metz, Tiden, & Schoeppner, 2007). By the age of 3 or 4 years, 
children appear to have a sophisticated understanding of the link between perception 
and knowledge (Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990; Robinson & Whitcombe, 2003; 
Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). For example, 4-year-olds understand that 
someone who has not heard the video will be ignorant about the specific information 
only mentioned in the video (Mossler, Marvin, & Greenberg, 1976). To learn the name 
of a novel object, preschool children trust people who has made it more than people 
who has not (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001). In addition, three-year-olds already know 
whether to pick up the information based on the certainty expressed by the informant 
(Jaswal & Malone, 2007; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001). 
The second is a trait, individual-dependent judgment. The judgment may be based 
on the informants’ characteristics, such as age, interest involved in the event, and their 
 57 
history. Young children hold the belief that adults know more than young children 
(Taylor, Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991). Children younger than second grade fail to 
discount the claims that are consistent with the informant’s interest (Mills & Keil, 
2005). Four-year-old children already demonstrate preference the informant with a 
past of accuracy over the inaccurate and ignorant informants (Clement, Koenig, & 
Harris, 2004; Koenig, Clement, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005). The 
preference may extend beyond the domain in which the two informants have 
previously demonstrated the difference in reliability (Rakoczy, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2009). Most of these studies were carried out in the context of word 
learning. On three trials, one informant labeled a familiar object correctly whereas the 
other did not. On the subsequent test trial, whether children would prefer to ask or 
endorse the label provided by the reliable informant over the unreliable one was 
examined. It has been suggested that children’s efficiency of evaluating the reliability 
of the informants varies with the domain of the information. Children may have a 
better accuracy in the tasks related with semantic knowledge (e.g., word learning) than 
epistemic knowledge (e.g., identity of the object) (Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2008). From 
paradigms like these, it has been found that children as young as three years old may 
also draw inference based on the information provided by the informant with a good 
track record (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008).  
Children’s ability to correctly accept or reject information provided by an 
informant is very important in children’s eyewitness testimony. In the legal context, 
each interviewer for child witnesses may introduce them new and possibly incorrect 
information which has potentially biasing effects on children’s subsequent reports. 
Preschool children were easily susceptible to misleading information (Bruck & Ceci, 
1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Nevertheless, during the process of answering questions, 
children may compare their own knowledge status to the interviewer’s knowledge 
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status of the same event and decide whether to update their own memory with the 
information provided by the interviewer. For example, preschool children know 
whether to believe the utterance based on whether the speaker has the direct access to 
the information (Robinson, Champion, & Mitchell, 1999). And school-aged children 
are more likely to say “I don’t know” to unanswerable questions to an interviewer who 
is ignorant about the original event than a knowledgeable interviewer (Waterman, 
Blades, & Spencer, 2004).  
In addition, the handful of research on the effect of warning in suggestibility is 
also illustrative to the relationship between knowledge about knowledge and 
suggestibility. In these studies, participants were warned about the misleading 
questions by acknowledging either the ignorance of the interviewer or the questions 
being tricky. That is, the informant’s credibility was invalidated explicitly to 
participants. However, it is inconclusive whether warning can reduce suggestibility in 
preschool children (Beuscher & Roebers, 2005). The research evidence indicates that 
children's increased ability to evaluate the informant's knowledge status may be 
associated with less suggestibility. 
By far, only a few studies have directly examined the relationship between 
children’s knowledge about knowledge and suggestibility, mostly examining only 
from one of the two aspects of the evaluations. In the studies focusing on the 
situational judgments (Welch-Ross, 1999a, 1999b), preschool children were 
interviewed about a story they but not the interviewer had previously heard. Some of 
the questions consisted of misleading information. Children’s understanding of seeing 
leads to knowing was also examined. The findings were mixing. In one study, 
knowledge about knowledge had no impact on either the initial yielding to misleading 
interview or the subsequent memory (Welch-Ross, 1999b). In contrast, in the other 
study(Welch-Ross, 1999a) and a study integrating the task into other theory-of-mind 
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tasks (Bright-Paul, Jarrold, & Wright, 2008), better source knowledge played a role, 
independent of age, in resisting misleading questioning, especially among children 
who had poor memory about the original event. In another group of studies, the 
evaluation of credibility focusing on trait judgments was examined. Misinformation 
effect was decreased or even diminished when the misinformation was delivered by a 
child (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987) or a silly adult (Lampinen & Smith, 1995) than a 
credible adult. 
In the real-life situations, comparing the knowledge status may involve both 
aspects. In addition, the conditions might be much more complex beyond the mere two 
aspects, such as combination across the two. The informant may demonstrate high 
individual-based credibility but low on the situation-based credibility, for example, a 
policeman who has not experienced the original event. This is has been little examined. 
The only exception is a study weighing two different factors both belong to trait 
judgments. Between the two kinds of factors indexing reliability, preschool children 
can weigh history of reliability over age (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). Therefore, in the 
current study, a series of questions would be used to examine both the context-
dependent and individual-dependent aspects of knowledge about knowledge. 
The present research investigated knowledge about knowledge as a promising 
influential factor of children’s suggestibility in a misleading interview. Epistemic 
information rather than semantic information was relevant to the context of eyewitness 
testimony. Therefore, two informants (dolls) providing conflicting epistemic 
information such as the identity of familiar objects were compared in the current study. 
Different from some previous studies on knowledge about knowledge,  judgment 
between the two informants instead of the identity of the object were asked for the 
following two reasons: to exclude the potential influence of memory about the identity 
of the object and to make the task brief and more age appropriate. Each child picked 
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one of the two dolls as the one they would seek information. Children’s suggestibility 
was examined with the Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (VSSC) (Scullin & 
Ceci, 2001), a measurement specifically designed for preschool children.  
Method 
Participants  
Fifty-three children (28 girls, 25 boys) recruited from four local day care 
centers and preschools participated. Their ages ranged from 37 months to 71 months 
(M = 52.26 months, SD = 8.63 months). The children were predominantly European 
Americans (n = 45), with a few of Asian American (n =6), African American (n =1) 
and multiethnic (n =1). An additional 5 children were dropped from the analyses for 
either failure to complete the interview protocal due to lack of interest (n =3) or out of 
the age range (85 month and 90 month) of the research interest. Written consent was 
obtained from each child’s parent or legal guardian prior to the beginning of the study. 
Each child received a toy after the study. 
Procedure 
Trained research assistants interviewed the child in each school. The two tasks 
were carried out by different research assistants who had been trained specifically for 
that task. Prior to the research sessions, the interviewers visited the children’s 
classrooms to acclimate with the children. The order between the memory test and 
source-monitoring assessment varied among children. 
Suggestibility 
Children first watched a 5-minute video “Billy’s Birthday Party” in a quiet 
area in their school individually, occasionally in the group of two (Schullin & Ceci, 
2001). The video included unexpected events such as fire alarm and  some clumsy 
behaviors (falling down, broken toy and dropping a cake). The VSSC interview was 
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administered at least one day after the video. The duration between the video and 
interview ranged from 1 to 21 days (M = 4.11, Median = 3.00, SD = 3.67). Two open-
ended non-leading questions (e.g., “Who was at the party?”) and two non-leading 
probe questions (e.g. “What happened when the children opened the presents?”) were 
asked first as a memory recall test. Then children were asked 18 yes/no leading 
questions (e.g., “Did the two girls arrive at the party in a bright red car?”). After the 
first 9 questions, ambiguous negative feedback was given (“You have made a few 
mistakes.  Let’s go over the questions again and see if you can do better.”) and the 
questions were repeated. The same procedure applied to the second 9 questions.  
Children’s responses were audio taped and transcribed verbatim for scoring. 
The memory recall test was scored following the scoring schema of VSSC. In general, 
children received 1 point for mentioning one of the scoring unit listed in the scoring 
schema. The number of affirmation to the inaccurate leading questions were counted 
as Yield, and the number of changing answers between “yes” and “no” (including “I 
don’t know” and “no response”) was counted as Shift. The highest possible Yield 
score is 14 (because the correct answers for 4 of the 18 questions were “yes”), and the 
highest possible Shift score is 18. 
Knowledge about Knowledge 
The materials include four dolls (three adult dolls and one child doll) , picture 
cards depicting single familiar item, drawers and one box with a big window and a 
small window.   
The dolls were introduced to the child participants during the test. Children 
participated in a game with 16 forced-choice questions between two informants. For 
each question, child participant first heard the descriptions about the two informants 
(if applicable), watched the two informants gain some perceptual experience, heard the 
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information he or she would seek, then chose between one of the two informants. The 
16 questions were listed in Table 5.1. We scored 1 for each correct answer unless the 
child participant indicated that the judgment was based on guessing. Reliability 
analysis showed the internal consistency is moderate (Cronbach’s α = .53). 
Results 
Preliminary analysis found no effect of gender on accuracy of recall and 
knowledge about knowledge, thus gender was not further considered. 
 In the suggestibility task (VSSC), children correctly provided 1.55 items (SD = 
1.96)  in free recall test. They on average scored 7.96 (SD = 3.98) for Yield and 5.06 
(SD = 3.60) for Shift. Better memory about the video in the free recall task was 
associated with less yields to the misleading interview, r (53) = -.38, p = .005. 
 The percentage of accuracy of each interview question was listed in Table 5.1. 
Except two questions (adult informant vs. child informant; adult with poor past of 
reliability and perceptual experience vs. adult with good past of reliability but no 
perceptual experience), children preferred one of the informant significantly than 
chance level. Due to the interviewer error or low interest of the child participant, a 
small amount (n =2) of the knowledge about knowledge interview questions were not 
asked. Therefore, a percentage score instead of the sum was calculated to indicate the 
total performance. The average score of the knowledge about knowledge was 0.68 (SD 
= 0.15, range = 0.31 – 1.00). 
 The correlational analyses only revealed that age was correlated with 
knowledge about knowledge, r (53) = .35,  p = .01. No relationship between 
knowledge about knowledge and either indice of suggestiblity (Yield and Shift) was 
found. Age was associated with both Yield and Shift. Older children were less likely 
to yield to misleading questions, r (53) = -.27, p = .06, but were more likely to shift 
their answers upon negative feedback, r (53) = .32, p = .02.  
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Table 5.1 
Knowledge about Knowledge Interview Questions and Percentage of Accuracy 
Item Credible Informant Informant Accuracy 
(%) 
1 Adult looks into the drawer Adult does nothing .89 
2 Adult looks into the drawer Adult thinks very hard .89 
3 Adult looks into the drawer Adult closes his eyes and makes a 
picture in his head that he can see the 
inside of the drawer 
.85 
4 Adult looks into the drawer  Adult looks at the outside of the drawer .77 
5 Adult looks into the drawer Adult lifts the drawer up .74 
6 Adult looks into the box through the 
big window 
Adult looks into the box through the 
small window 
.64 
7 Adult looks into the box, says, “I 
know this quite clearly.” 
Adult looks into the box, says, “I’m not 
at all sure about this.” 
.75 
8 A sea shell collection competition was just over  in the town. Everyone in the 
town knows who the winner is. 
.15 
 An adult who was not involved in the 
competition. 
An adult who took participation in the 
competition and really wanted 
everyone else thought he had the most 
sea shells. 
 
9 An adult who is nice looks into the 
drawer 
An adult who is naughty and always 
ticks other people looks into the drawer 
.77 
10 A smart adult looks into the drawer A silly adult looks into the drawer .66 
11 An adult looks into the drawer A child looks into the drawer .60 
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Table 5.1(Continued) 
 
12 A child who makes the picture An adult who does not make the 
picture 
.66 
13 An adult who has answered questions 
correctly for three times answers a 
question similar with previous 
questions 
An adult who has made mistakes three 
times answers a question similar with 
previous questions 
.79 
14 A child who has answered questions 
correctly for three times answers a 
question similar with previous 
questions 
An adult who has made mistakes three 
times answers a question similar with 
previous questions 
.32 
15 An adult who has made mistakes 
three times looks into the drawer 
An adult who has answered correctly 
three times feels the outside of the 
drawer without looking into the drawer 
.58 
16 An adult who has made one mistake 
out of five questions answers a 
question similar with previous 
questions 
An adult who has made three mistakes 
out of five answers a question similar 
with previous questions 
.77 
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For Yield, series of analyses were carried out with the correctness of each  interview 
question as fixed factor, controlling for age and memory about the video. For Shift, 
similar analyses were carried out with the correctness of each interview question as 
fixed factor, controlling for age. The number of yields and shifts only vary on a few of 
the items (Table 5.2). Two items indicating children’s understanding that perceptual 
experience leads to knowledge were found to be associated with suggestibility, yields 
and shifts, respectively. The differentiation between the outcome of looking and 
thinking in the knowledge status was associated with fewer shifts whereas the 
discrimination between looking and imaging in mind was associated with fewer yields. 
On the other hand, interestingly, when children understand that the interest involved in 
an event may bias the credibility of the information, they were more likely to shift 
upon negative feedback.  
Discussion 
 The current study examined the relationship between knowledge about 
knowledge and suggestibility. Importantly, both the situational and individual-based 
evaluations were included when examining knowledge about knowledge (Miller, 
2000). Preschool children already hold some sophisticated knowledge about 
knowledge that their overall performance is pretty satisfactory. Although the overall 
performance of knowledge about knowledge was not found to be associated with 
either of the two indices of suggestiblity, analyses based on individual items found 
some association. Consistent with the previous findings (Bright-Paul, et al., 2008; 
Welch-Ross, 1999a), knowledge about knowledge serves as a protecting factor against 
susceptibility to misleading questions in some situations. However, in a task which is 
beyond the preschool children’s understanding (Mills & Keil, 2005), those who 
correctly discounted the information from the informant who had  interests involved in 
the event were more likely to shift their answers following negative feedback. 
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Table 5.2 
Knowledge about Knowledge and Suggestibility 
Item Knowledge about knowledge Suggestibility Correct Incorrect  F  
2 Perceptual experience leads to 
knowledge 
Shift 4.74 
(3.60) 
7.50 
(2.74) 
2.97# 
3 Perceptual experience leads to 
knowledge 
Yield 7.57 
(3.99) 
10.88 
(2.03) 
4.35* 
8 Interest involved may bias the 
information provided 
Shift 7.38 
(4.98) 
4.64 
(3.19) 
3.03# 
#
 
 p < .10, * p < .05. 
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The limited evidence in the current study indicates that the situational rather 
than individual-based evaluations may play a more important role in suggestibility. 
This is consistent with the previous finding that in the domain of epistemic knowledge, 
children are less likely to focus on past reliability to evaluate the informants (Nurmsoo 
& Robinson, 2008). 
 The missing link between the overall knowledge about knowledge and 
suggestibility is very intriguing. It is possible that knowledge about knowledge plays a 
trivial role in suggestibility, as previously found (Welch-Ross, 1999b) and has been 
suggested in warning studies (Beuscher & Roebers, 2005). It is also possible that the 
tests in the current study were not sensitive enough to capture the underlying 
difference. On one hand, the validity of the knowledge about knowledge interview 
needs to be further examined. On the other hand, in the current suggestibility task, the 
knowledge status was not different between the interviewer and the child except the 
age. Different from previous studies (e.g., Welch-Ross, 1999b), the child and the 
interviewer in the current study watched the video together. There was little need for 
children to apply their knowledge about knowledge to resist the misinformation from 
the interviewer. To better explore the relationship between knowledge about 
knowledge, an interviewer who is known to child participants with a poorer 
knowledge status than themselves might be more appropriate.  
 In early childhood, it is important for children to be gullible so that they could 
quickly learn information from the environment. However, with their ages, they start 
to evaluate information critically. The relationship between knowledge about 
knowledge and suggestibility to misleading information in a memory task is still 
controversial. The current study provides some preliminary evidence that the 
understanding of the relationship between perceptual experience and knowledge status 
may play a role of reducing suggestibility, independent of the age and memory effect.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
 
 The current studies examined four aspects of metacognition and suggestibility 
and revealed  some interesting findings. Metamemory, knowledge about narrative 
context and source monitoring abilities were associated with preschool children’s 
suggestibility. Furthermore, these revealed influences were independent of the age 
effect. Interestingly, in the current age group, better metacognition does not guarantee 
less suggestibility but rather depending on how we define and measure suggestibility. 
As one process of incorrectly accepting misinformation from external sources, 
suggestibility may be presented in different ways. In the current studies, assenting to 
misleading questions and changing previous answers in repeated questioning upon 
negative feedback were explored, with the former referred as Yield and the latter 
referred as Shift. The findings indicated that better procedural metamemory and 
source monitoring was associated with fewer Yields. In contrast, declarative 
metamemory, knowledge about narrative contexts and source monitoring abilities 
increased the number of Shifts. 
 Research focusing on individual differences is helpful to undercover the 
mechanism of children’s suggestibility (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). The current studies 
indicate both cognitive and social factors are related to suggestibility. On one hand, 
better memory is associated with more resistance to misleading information (Pezdek & 
Roe, 1995) across all the studies. On the other hand, social factors also play an 
important role. For example, when there is individual difference in social related 
knowledge (e.g., knowledge about narrative context), there is difference in 
suggestibility. Considering the fact that initial false assents have been indicated to 
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reflect the cognitive aspect of suggestibility and shifting to reflect social oriented 
mechanism, the present studies suggest that metacognition may play different roles in 
suggestibility depending on the different mechanisms (Kulkofsky & Klemfuss, 2008; 
Schullin & Ceci, 2001). Other work, like training studies, however, needs to be carried 
out to address the causal relationship between metacognition and suggestibility.  
 The current study has some limitations. For example, the validity of several 
metacognition measurements (metamemory, knowledge about narrative context, and 
knowledge about knowledge status) were designed and used for the first time in the 
current study. Most of them only have moderate reliability, which needs to be 
improved in future studies.  
 In addition, in the present studies, only interrogative suggestibility (assents and 
shifts to misleading questions) was examined. As previously stated, even within 
interrogative suggestibility, great variation has veen revealed in terms of suggestibility 
and metacognition. However, interrogative suggestibility is just one way of 
suggestibility. How the metacognition has played a role in children’s incorporating 
false information into their later reports has remained unanswered. Future research is 
needed to provide more information about the relationship between metacognition and 
suggestibility. 
 Some of the interesting findings also call for further studies. For example, in 
the current studies, a small age range (3 to 5) was the focus in which we found that 
changing answers upon negative feedback increased with age. Although the finding 
was consistent with previous studies (Schullin & Ceci, 2001), more studies in the area 
of suggestibility have suggested that preschoolers are more likely to change their 
answers than school-aged children (Cassel, Robers, & Bjorklund, 1996; Poole & 
White, 1991). More studies with a wider age range are helpful to resolve the 
discrepancy. 
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 In conclusion, the current studies suggest that metacognition plays an 
important role in preschool children’s suggestibility. It may both increase and decrease 
the extent of suggestibility, depending on the measurement of suggestibility. The 
results highlight that cognitive and social mechanisms underlie suggestibility.  
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